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INTRODUCTION
It has been roughly a quarter-century since William Rehnquist took
over as Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Under first his
stewardship and then that of his former clerk John Roberts, the Supreme
Court has grown increasingly skeptical about the efficacy of litigation,
increasingly parsimonious in construing federal statutes that facilitate
litigation, and increasingly uninterested in  insuring the availability
of functional remedies for the violation of federal rights.' I n  matters of
interpretation—both statutory and constitutional—the Court's course has
been more complicated, but it would be difficult to contest the assertion
Associate Professor of Law, Seattle University School of  Law. BA,  Yale University; JD, New
York University School of Law; MA in History, Princeton University. This Essay and the others in
this Symposium arise out of a roundtable in which the Symposium authors participated at the 2008
Southeastern Association of Law Schools annual meeting. I  would like to thank the organizers of
that conference and the audience participants for nourishing this project and the editors of the Seattle
University Law Review for giving it a home. Special thanks also to the other symposium participants
for stimulating my own ideas. Their  contributions all appear in this volume, except for  those of
Amanda Frost. F or  those interested in her ideas on this topic, see Amanda Frost, Overvaluing
Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008).
1. For discussion of these themes during the Rehnquist Era, see for example Daniel J. Meltzer,
The Supreme Court's Judicial Passivity, 2002 Sup. CI. REV. 343, 343 (2002); Judith Resnik,
Constricting Remedies: The Rehnquist Judiciary, Congress, and Federal Power, 78 IND. L.J. 223,
224 (2003); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organiz-
ing Theme in the Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006). Dur ing its first
few years under the stewardship of Chief Justice Roberts, the Court has given no indication that it is
deviating from its anti-litigation course. Indeed, the court-closing consequences of the Court's deci-
sions were the lead story in most analyses of October Term 2006. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, In
Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y TIMES, July 1, 2007, at Al  (describing
October Term 2006 as "the year the Court closed the courts"); Posting of  Andrew Siegel to
PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsb1awg.blogs.comiprawfsblawg/2007/06/hostility_to_li.html, "Litigation
Hostility in the Early Roberts Court" (June 6, 2007, 10:41 PST).
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that it has tacked in the direction of more formalistic approaches that
increasingly focus our attention on statutory text and historical evidence
at the expense of other forms of evidence and argument.
2 The Court's course in these matters has been justified by—and
perhaps propelled b y
3
— a  
p a r t i c u l a r  
v i s i o n
4  
o f  
t h
e  
j u d i








vision, judges play a limited and secondary role in the maintenance of
the American polity. Judges exist to resolve disputes and answer techni-
cal questions about the meaning of statutes and discrete constitutional
texts. They are definitively and categorically prohibited from "making
law." Even within their narrow sphere of permissible activity, judges are
not to be proactive, but rather are to sit back and wait to see if  Congress,
in its infinite wisdom, has chosen to break the glass and call on their
expertise. As  Chief Justice Roberts evocatively opined,
s j u d g e s  p r o p e d yunderstand their role to act as "umpires," making sure that pre-existing
ruies are _areirf*AY-i-P4id even-handedi
y e r i t o r c e
d i  a n d :  
$ t a y i n g ' o t n  
o f  
t h e
way as much as possible
The Rehnquist and Roberts




2. Though a citation should be unnecessary, one might see William Michael Treanor. T ak i
ngText Too Seriously: Modern Textualism, Original Meaning, and Amos's Bill of Rights, 106 Mt
Rsv. 487, 488 (2007) ("In less than twenty years, textualism has moved from the periphery of con-
stitutional discourse to a position of the greatest prominence") and Jonathan T. Moist, The Rise and
Foil of  Textualism, 106 CoLutd. L. REV. I  (2.0(
1
6)  ( " '  l e x t u a l i s t s  
h a v e  
b e e n  
s o  
s u c c e s s fi a l  
d i s c r e d i t
-
ing smug puoposivism and updating. theirmew brand of tngt.lerg Wqualisin that they have forged a
new consensus on the interpretive anterpriSe that dwarf' any remaining disagreementS"),
3. -Whether recent shills in Supreme Court doctrine and methodology have actually been
motivated by—as opposed Sc simply justified by—a principled commitment to a limited judicial role
is &matter of passionate dispute that this -Essay cannot resolve and will not engage. For  my earlier
view on the topic, see Siegel, supra note a t  11 7  (rejecting explanation of the Rehitquist Court's
courticlosing decisions grounded in separation of powers concerns):
4. My decision to talk about "Visions" of the judielal role is•heiVily influenced by the work of
my fonner colleague, Tontrily Crocker, who argues that disputes about constitutional doctrine. stmc-
tureand methodology are, at bottom, arguments about hove we "envision" an ideal constitutional
culture. See Thomas P. Crocker, Envisioning the Constitution, 5.; Am. U. L. REV, 1 (2007). I t  is
also driven by my sense that the ideas about the judicial role that have currency in our constitutional
culture are insufficiently fleshed out to count as 'theories," but go well beyond mete -
i n s t i n c t s "  o r"notions.'  For  further discussion of how such conversations ought to be pitched, see infra Part LA.
those who resist the visual metaphor, "conceptions" might be the best substitute.
5: Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judielaiy, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of -
















































































ake, ' .re everybody plays by the roles, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a:ball game to
see the umpire."). _
6. But see Michael P._ Allen, A (Limited) Defense o,
SEATTLE U L  REv. 525 (2009) (arguing that the anal°
active judicial mOdel).
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most part, been hotly contested] Many  have drawn stinging dissents
which, particularly i n  recent years, have expressly identified and
contested the Court's anti-litigation orientation.
8 I n  a  v a r i e t y  
o f  a r e a s ,
ranging from implied private right of  action cases to technical cases
interpreting the scope o f  the Federal Rules o f  Appellate Procedure,
Justices Stevens, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter have taken turns ques-
tioning the wisdom, the historical accuracy, and even the interpretive
integrity of the Court's court-closing decisions•
9 A c a d e m i c  
c o m m e n t a -
tors have echoed—and expanded upon—their criticisms," as have
politicians and popular commentators."
Intriguingly, however, those who have been quick to criticize the
substance of the Court's decisions and its anti-litigation orientation have
not, as yet, done much to challenge the vision of the judicial role that
undergirds the Court's approach. Wh i le  an occasional Justice might
explicitly contest the majority's approach to statutory interpretation" or
their framework for deciding, say, private right of  action cases," the
Justices rarely dig deeper to critique, let alone offer alternatives to, the
broad pronouncements about the judicial role that often dot the Court's
anti-litigation opinions."
7. See Siegel, supra note 1, at 1126-27 (explaining that the Supreme Court's court-closing
decisions have been characterized by "[c]onsistent 5-4 voting patterns and spirited dissents" even
though all nine Justices are to some degree litigation-hostile).
8. See, e.g., Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1954 (2007) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("In the end, the Court's decision can only be explained by its increasing familiar effort








































































3, 2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 128 S. Ct. 761
(2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting);
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
10. In addition to the works cited supra note 1, see for  example Peter Strauss, Courts or
Tribunals? Federal Courts and the Common Law, 53 ALA. L. REV. 891 (2002); Tracy A. Thomas,
Proportionality and the Supreme Court's Jurisprudence of Remedies, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 121-22
(2007).
Note, for example, the strident public criticism of the Court's decision in Ledbetter, 550
U.S. 618, which led to the case becoming an issue in the 2008 Presidential Election and, ultimately,
to its statutory undoing. See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5
(2009).
12. See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep' t of Educ., 127 S. Ct. 1534, 1549 (2007)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
13. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14. The dissenting Justices have not been entirely silent on questions about the judicial role,
particularly in their off-the-bench writings. Justice Stephen G. Breyer, in particular, has attempted to
articulate an overarching theory of  the judicial role, most notably in his book ACTIVE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005). While ACTIVE LIBERTY has not yet made
a substantial dent in the broader culture's attitudes about the proper judicial role, i t  probably
deserved greater attention than we have given it in this Symposium.
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The Justices' unwillingness to explicitly articulate an alternative
vision of the judicial role tracks developments in broader culture. In  the
contemporary United States, the debate over the proper judicial role is
one-sided. We hear the same language with striking persistence: Judges
should "find law" not "make law." "Judicial activism" is bad; "judicial
restraint" is good.
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ties in our complicated democratic polity, unelected judges should get
out of the way and leave the heavy lifting to the democratic branches.
To d  otherwise is to live under "judicial tyranny."
16 V o i c e s  f r o m  
a c r o s s
the political spectrum warn of the dangers of "judicial supremacy"
17 a n dl ud the virtues of judicial "minimalism."
18 It is  my belief—and the premise o f  this Symposium—that the
absence from both Supreme Court dissents and public debate o f  a
coherent alternative vision of  the judicial role is a failure of  rhetoric
rather than a failure of ideas. Those of us who have made academic or
professional careers out of critiquing and challenging the parsimonious
decisions of the recent Supreme Court find ourselves facing a stacked
deck when we turn to the task of articulating an affirmative alternative
vision. The language of restraint, minimalism, and passivity are so para-
digmatic that efforts to break out of them often break down over simple
questi ns of vocabulary.
19 F o r  
r e a s o n s  
o f  
b o t h  
p o l i t i
c s  
a n
d  
s u b s
t a n c
e ,
few would voluntarily embrace the labels "judicial maximalist," "judicial
supremacist," or "judicial activist." Similarly, it is impossible to imagine
15. Craig Green carefully traces the intellectual history o f  these particular terms i n a
forthcoming Article. See Craig Green, An Intellectual History of  Judicial Activism, 62 VAND. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009).
16. See generally, e.g., MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: How THE SUPREME COURT IS
DESTROYING AMERICA (2005) (accusing the Supreme Court of "judicial tyranny").
17. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115
BARN/. L. REV. 4 (2001).
18. See,  e. g. ,  CASS R.  SUNSTEIN,  O NE CASE AT  A  T I ME:  JUDI CI AL MI NI MALI SM O N T HE
SUPREME COURT (1999). Though Professor Sunstein has been the leading academic advocate for
"judicial minimalism," he also has been willing to acknowledge its faults. See, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1899 (2006).
19. The power of a prevailing discourse to impose constraints on the ability to give voice
to countervailing instincts and ideas, of course, transcends questions of vocabulary. In our constitu-
tional culture, for example, we have developed archetypes of the "good judge" and the "bad judge,"
which loom over any discussion o f  the judicial role and police the boundaries o f  acceptable
argument despite a near-consensus among judges and scholars that the archetypes seriously over-
simplify and distort the process of judging. I f ,  as the archetypes would have it, we are in the midst
of a Manichean struggle between "good judges" (who understand the limited nature of  their own
role, forsake the temptation to use the tools of common law adjudication to transform their policy
preferences into law, and develop the humility to tolerate the compromises of imperfect democratic
lawmaking) and "bad judges" (who, drunk with their own power, mistake their own beliefs for legal
commands), judges and commentators have strong political and psychological incentives to associate
themselves with the forces of light, whatever their actual practices.
2009] N o t e s  Towards an Alternate Vision 5 1 5
a nominee to the Supreme Court analogizing their role to that of a batter
or pitcher in a baseball game.
When the authors in this Symposium gathered for our initial round-
table, we gave ourselves the task of affirmatively and unapologetically
articulating a vision of what it is that courts should be doing. While the
substance of our answers were grounded in our critiques of the Court's
current approach, the goal was to speak in our own language in an effort
to bypass the rhetorical traps set by the politics o f  the last several
decades. What became abundantly clear after our two-hour session was
that paradigm-shifting concepts cannot be ordered up on demand; our
progress, though substantial, was incremental.
In preparing essays for the written portion of this Symposium, each
author has taken a slightly different path. Scott Moss, focusing in on the
role of the trial judge in employment cases, identifies a crucial judicial
function that has withered from disuse—the evaluation of  conflicting
evidentiary claims drawing lessons from its decline, and explaining
the single importance of revitalizing it .
20 T a k i n g  a  
s i m i l a r  
t a c k ,  
S t e v e
Vladeck calls o  the current Supreme Court to account for its failure to
fulfill its obligation to give content to the Constitution's criminal proce-
dure provisions, offering a procedural tweak that might get the Court
back onto the path of fulfilling its law-saying obligations.
21 W i t h  c h a r a c -teristic chutzpa, Mike Allen attempts to capture the judge-as-umpire
analogy for those who favor a more active judiciary, questioning many of
the Chief Justice's assumptions about both law and baseba11.
22 C a p r i c eRoberts takes the broadest approach, interrogating our legal order and
broader culture for explanations as to why current rules of jurisdiction
and justiciability produce a judiciary that is at crucial moments anemic
and then offering a new paradigm for empowering the Judiciary in some
such cases.
23 
F i n a l l
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further frame our collective project and then begin to tentatively explore
some of the rhetoric and themes that might be of service in articulating a
new affirmative vision of the judicial role.
The Essays in this Symposium can be read with profit as stand-
alone contributions to legal scholarship. However, they also profit from
being read together in a single setting. What comes through these piec-
es—and a host of other recent scholarship on similar topics by scholars
20. Scott A. Moss, Reluctant Judicial Factfinding: When Minimalism and Judicial Modesty Go
Too Far, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 549 (2009).
21. Steven I. Vladeck, AEDPA, Saucier, and the Stronger Case for Rights-First Constitutional
Adjudication, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 595 (2009).
22. Allen, supra note 6.
23. Caprice L. Roberts, Asymmetric World Jurisprudence, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 569 (2009).
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tion's collective frustration with the limited rhetorical and intellectual
space that the prevailing legal order has marked off for discussions of the
judicial role. This  Symposium represents an effort to channel some of
that frustration in a creative and productive direction.
I. RE-ENVISIONING THE JUDICIAL ROLE: A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
Imagine a nominee for  the United States Supreme Court who
believes that, over the last quarter-century, the Court has become
excessively formalistic in its modes of interpretation, unduly hostile to
litigation, and inappropriately blasé to the court-closing and rights-
limiting consequences of its rulings. Also, imagine our fictional nominee
to be brave (and perhaps a little foolish). When asked by Senators
whether he considers himself a "judicial activist," this nominee eschews
a simple denial and offers a sophisticated answer in which he questions
the utility of terms such as "judicial activism" and "judicial restraint."
27When asked if, like John Roberts, he believes that judges are simply um-
pires, he declines the opportunity to r iff on baseball, Mom, and apple pie,
and instead offers a nuanced explanation on the virtues and the (serious)
limitations of such an analogy. After  several hours of back and forth
about labels, analogies, and particular cases, a prickly Senator from a
bright red state asks the chipper nominee to cut out the fancy footwork
and identify for the Committee his vision of the proper judicial role. The
remainder of this Essay asks two related questions: First, what are the
requisites of a successful answer? And second, how might the nominee
go about constructing such an answer?
A. The Proper Pitch
Any inquiry into the requisites of a successful answer must begin
with the issue of pitch. When people talk about judges, they talk in vary-
ing registers and with varying degrees of  sophistication. O n  the one
24. See, e.g., Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959 (2008).
25. See Green, supra note 15.
26. See, e.g., Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the
Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L. J. 121 (2005).
27. Many scholars and commentators have written eloquently about the need to get beyond the
language of "judicial activism." For  a recent comment of my own along this vein, see Posting of
Andrew Siegel to ProfsBlawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com, " A Shared Vision of  the Judicial
Role" (June 26, 2008, 14:28 PST) (commenting that, in light of recent decisions of the Supreme
Court, "the gap between the reality of constitutional law (in which two groups of judges committed
to a broad judicial role battle over the substance of the rights to be jealously protected) and the
rhetoric of  constitutional politics ( in which liberal "activists" battle conservatives committed to
"judicial restraint") has grown untenable").
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hand, there is vast academic literature on judges and judging, much of it
sophisticated and nuanced. While we would presumably hope that our
fictional nominee is well-versed in that literature, it  would be neither
responsive nor wise for him to respond with a jargon-filled taxonomy of
judicial functions or virtues.
28 ( I n d e e d ,  
i t  
w a s  
h i s  
c a u t i o
u s  
a t t e
m p t  
t o
incorporate a degree of academic precision that got him in the hot seat in
the first place.) So, high theory is out.
On the fl ip side, however, the question calls for  more than a
political catch phrase or an invective-filled diatribe. While much public
discussion o f  judging takes place in those terms, the setting and the
stakes require greater engagement with the question. (Perhaps, earlier in
the proceeding, the nominee might have tip-toed off of the firing line
with a charming personal anecdote or a folksy appeal to common sense,
but that door is now closed.) The nominee's answer must resound in
terms that the public will understand; but, it must also reflect a level of
seriousness and erudition commensurate with the position to which she
aspires and must survive at least cursory vetting by academic and profes-
sional commentators.
29 I n  
s h o r t ,  
i t  
m u s t  
b e  
s t u d i
o u s l y  
" m i d d
l e b r o
w . " "
B. The Characteristics of a Successful Answer
A successful answer to such a loaded question requires not only the
proper tone but an appreciation for the several layers on which the
question operates. Discussions of the judicial role inherently call to mind
a mixture of descriptive, prescriptive, and normative questions. While in
some contexts we might productively cabin our discussion of judging to




























































Justice the nominee would be; but, any answer the prospective Justice
gives will be vetted for consistency with the actual work of the courts
and will be dissected for potential criticisms of her future colleagues.
Furthermore, accuracy and insight are not enough; even the wisest and
most careful answer will fail to achieve its instrumental objectives if, for
28. So, with apologies to the interesting and important work done by Lawrence Solum and
thers writing in this vein, we will not be hearing any citation to "a virtue-centered theory of
judging." C f  Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory of Judging, 34
METAPHILOSOPHY 178 (2003).
29. Anyone who doubts the importance for a Supreme Court nominee of looking and sounding
like a serious constitutional thinker, or  o f  minimally impressing the relevant scholarly and
professional communities, should attend to the tale of Harriet Miers.
30. 1 have always had an appreciation for the role of "middlebrow" communication in shaping
culture, but my willingness to embrace the term stems largely from a conversation with Amanda
Frost about the pros and cons of  different models of  scholarship. I  thank her for that valuable
exchange.
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example, it comes across as aloof
3I o r  s u g g e s t s  
a n  
u n p o p u l a r  
a p p r o a
c h  
t o
politically-sensitive or emotionally-charged issues.
When envisioning and articulating alternative conceptions of  the
judicial role, our fictional nominee—and anyone else who wishes to
influence our constitutional culture—must keep in mind three requisites.
First, the vision must be descriptively accurate: that is, i t  must be
plausibly consistent with the great bulk  o f  the Supreme Court's
decisions, particularly those in which the Court has dealt with questions
of its own powers vis-à-vis other branches of govemment.
32 S e c o n d ,  i tmust b  normatively desirable: that is, it  must forward an appealing
and achievable vision for a successful legal order. Finally , it must be
politically persuasive: that is, it must speak in terms that resonate with—
or at least do not run afoul of—our deepest cultural commitments.
IL NOTES TOWARDS AN ANSWER: A CONCEPTUAL TOOL-KIT
While it may be possible to develop and articulate an over-arching
alternative conception of the judicial role through a process of deduction
from broad postulates about the interaction between the courts, the other
branches, and the broader culture, that project has borne at most minimal
fruit over the last several decades. Our fictional nominee—and those of
us who share in his project—might, therefore, adopt an alternative,
inductive strategy. Instead of starting at the top and working down, we
might identify a set of themes, rhetoric, and ideas about the proper func-
tioning of the courts that meet the above criteria (descriptive accuracy,
normative desirability, and political persuasiveness) and use them as the
building blocks for constructing a broader theory. In  this Part, I identify
and briefly discuss five such themes and the role each might play in this
project.
31. Here the classic referent is Robert Bork, who, by many accounts, doomed his Supreme
Court candidacy when he explained that his primary motivation for seeking a seat on the Court was
that the Court's work would be "an intellectual feast." See ETHAN BRUNNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE:
How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA 275-76 (1989) (recounting Bork's description of
the Supreme Court as "an intellectual feast," confirming the fear of many that Bork "just wanted to
play with ideas" and was unaware "that beyond those elegant intellectual constructs, the lives of real
people hung in the balance").
32. To be clear, my suggestion is not that a model of judging must accord with every area of
contemporary doctrine; nor do I suggest that those offering alternative models of judging cannot
critique or call for the overruling of existing case law. Rather, I merely point Out that, in order to
achieve plausibility, any proposed model of judging must look broadly familiar to those attuned to
coherent doctrine and practices.
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A. The Partnership Paradigm
Scholars skeptical of the Supreme Court's recent turn to formalism
in both statutory and constitutional interpretations have frequently
invoked the language o f  "partnership" to explain their vision of  the
Court's proper role.
33 T h e  
p a r t n e r
s h i p  
m o d
e l  
s u g g
e s t s  
t h








Court ought to conceptualize itself as working in tandem with some other
entity—be it the legislature, the Framers, or earlier Courts—toward some
common end.
For advocates of a more assertive judiciary, the partnership model
has great appeal. The core insight of the partnership metaphor is that
judges should be unapologetic about judging. I n  conceptualizing an
ongoing, nonhierarchical relationship between branches of government
(or between generations) this model has the potential to purge the guilt
that most judges have internalized from a constitutional culture obsessed
with the counter-majoritarian objection and originalist methodologies.
34 The partnership model also has the virtue of grounding claims for a
more robust judiciary in the core principles of American constitutional-
ism. As  legal historians have long explained,
35 t h e  A m e r i c a n  
e x p e r i m e n t
with constitutional self-government was made possible by a  break-
through in political theory: the realization that a sovereign people acting
collectively can—and probably should—divide up the duties and
responsibilities of governance among different entities without designat-
ing one such entity as "sovereign." In Justice Kennedy's famous phrase,
the Founders "split the atom of sovereignty."
36 I f  i t  i s  t h e  
p e o p l e  
w h o  
a r e
ultimately sovereign, and all branches are doing their bidding according
to rules proscribed for nominal, substantive reasons, then judges should
undertake their duties with pride and a sense of purpose.
33. For a discussion of the role of  the partnership metaphor in the battle over methods of
statutory interpretations, see Molot, supra note 2, at 6-7 (contrasting the "faithful actor model" with
a view of judges as "coequal partners" and "members of a coordinate branch of government that
share equal responsibility for law elaboration"). For  one among the many constitutional theorists
who use the language o f  "partnership," see generally LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN
PLAINCLOTHES: A  THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE (2004).
34. Concern—most would say obsession—with the Democratic legitimacy o f  judicial
decisionmaldng is a nearly ubiquitous feature of American constitutional theory. Credit for kicking
off the modem wave of concern over the subject usually goes to ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) .
35. Despite its arguably snide tone, the best book on the emergence of the theory of popular
sovereignty during the revolutionary era is still EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE
RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ENG LAND AND AMERICA (1989).
36. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy was speaking about issues of federalism when he coined the metaphor, but the same
analytic move necessary to justify American federalism was also required to explain the existence of
co-equal branches of government.
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While the partnership metaphor has substantial utility for someone
seeking to explain why the prevailing vision of the judicial role is unduly
cramped, standing alone it does not provide an alternative vision. When
viewed in the abstract, the partnership model simply begs too many
questions: With whom are judges in partnership? T o  what ends? O n
what terms?
37 
W i t h o




























cannot answer basic questions about what it is that a judge is supposed
to—or is not supposed to—do. Those answers must come from sources
external to the notion and language of partnership. Perhaps, then, the
notion of judicial partnership is better thought of as a paradigm within
which to build an alternative vision of  the judicial role, rather than a
vision in and of itself.
B. Of Rights and Remedies
Perhaps the single aspect of the Court's recent anti-litigation deci-
sions that most raises the hackles of non-legal audiences is the frequency
with which the Court's decisions leave individuals, whose rights have
been infringed, without viable remedies.
38 S u c h  
d e c i s i o n s  
s t r i k e  
m a n y
observers as violations of both natural justice and of our legal system's
founding commitments. Af t e r  all, Justice John Marshall's rhetorical
question in Marbuty v. Madison wondering, " I f  [Marbury] has a right
and, if  that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him
a remedy?"
39 i s  
o n e  

































Now, those better versed in legal doctrine understand that our legal
system has treated that precept as aspirational rather than prescriptive. In
a long line of cases stretching back to Marbury itself, our courts have
recognized that—for a  variety o f  legal, practical, and institutional
reasons—some rights are simply under- or un-enforceable.
413 T o  s u g g e s tthat the purpo e of courts i  to remedy all violations of rights with a
37. When more formalist scholars criticize those who adopt the language of "partnership," their
criticism more often than not is aimed at the partnership scholars' claims about these subsidiary
questions. C f  Motor, supra note 2, at 6-7 (characterizing the partnership position in the statutory
interpretation debate as including claims of "coequal" status with the legislature and the subject of
that partnership as "law elaboration").
38. Many of  the Court's litigation-hostile decisions specifically foreclose the availability of
remedies for individuals who have—or are likely to have—meritorious claims. Some such deci-
sions, like Ledbetter, are case- or statute-specific. Others, like the Court's broad embrace of quali-
fied and sovereign immunity, are more general.
39. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,162 (1803).
40. See generally John C. Jeffries, Jr., Essay, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law,
109 YALE 1,..1.87 (1999) (demonstrating the persistence of a gap between rights and remedies and
arguing that, under some circumstances, the gap serves salutary purposes).
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"though the heavens may fall" zeal would certainly raise questions about
the descriptive accuracy of one's theory of judging.
Nevertheless, there is certainly some room to employ the language
of rights and remedies in defining and advocating for a more robust
judicial role. A s  many commentators have demonstrated, the modem
Supreme Court has become increasingly sanguine about issuing deci-
sions that leave important rights un- or under-protected.
41 T h e r e  i s  amajor differenc  between acknowledging that a one-to-one fit between
rights and remedies is a practical impossibility and losing sight of the
core institutional goal of providing efficient and effective relief to those
whose substantive entitlements have been improperly trampled. Return-
ing focus to the goal of  calibrating remedies to rights is a politically
potent and substantively sound tool for exploring and articulating the
contours of the judicial role.
C. Of Law and Equity
According to a common (and largely accurate) story, once upon a
time there were two systems of courts in the Anglo-American world: law
courts, which enforced a more established set of  rules often without
regard to their consequences, and equity courts, which applied free-
floating principles to smooth the rough edges o f  the common law.
42Under our current structure of federal c iv il procedure, a single set of
federal courts possess all (or more accurately most) of the powers that
traditionally belonged to both law and equity courts.
43 O n e  w a y  t o  
t e l l
the tale of the Rehnquist and Rober s years is to argue that the Supreme
Court has increasingly become uncomfortable with its equitable role.'
While that diagnosis is not perfect, it resonates very well with the
tenor and substance of many of the Court's decisions. Lik e the rights
and remedies language discussed above, the language of law and equity
has both substantive and political appeal for those seeking to construct an
alternative model of judging. Both substantively and rhetorically, "law"
and "equity" stand out as a sort of judicial "yin" and "yang": a paired set
of approaches to the administration o f  justice that must be properly
41. See, e.g., id.; see also Thomas, supra note 10; Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi  Remedium:
The Fundamental Right to a Remedy, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633 (2004).
42. For one abbreviated version of the tale, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 26 (2d ed. 1985) (describing how equity courts at one time applied loose principles
of equity in an ad hoc fashion but eventually developed a coherent set of principles of their own,
"almost a system of antilaw").
43. See FED. R. Civ. P. 2 ("There is one form of action—the civil action.").
44. To some extent, that is the story Judith Resnik tells in Resnik, supra note I.
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balanced in order for a court system to function properly." Wh i le
denigration of the "law" side of the equation leads to ad hoc judging and
threatens chaos, denigration of the "equity" side of the equations leads to
excessive formalism and threatens justice. A  vision of the judicial role
that conceptualizes the "good judge" as someone who properly balances
the legal and equitable impulses, has substantial potential to add texture
and substance to our cultural conversation about judging.
D. Questions of Institutional Competence
For several generations before the 1980s, the ideas of the "Legal
Process" school represented the orthodox approach in conversations
about the judicial role." Legal Process orthodoxy was subject to a host
of legitimate criticisms and cracked under the strain.
47 I  h a v e  n o  
s p a c e  t o
recount t ese criticisms and n  desire for a wholesale revival of the legal
process pproach. However, at the risk of reigniting old battles, those
advocating for a more robust alternative to the prevailing vision of the
judicial role ought to consider the utility of some of the core insights of
the Legal Process school. In particular, there may well still be mileage in
the proposition that, when determining how to divide the labor o f
democratic governance, we ought to focus our attention on the relative
competence o f  different institutions t o  answer different types o f
questions." Under such an approach, our tolerance for judicial judgment
is differentiated depending on the nature of  the questions and dispute
before the court. Judicial expertise becomes the ticket to more active
judicial engagement on some matters, say questions of remediation and
procedure. A  renewed focus on institutional competence would demand
a more nuanced alternative vision of the judicial role: one that acknowl-
edges that there are many areas in which a court must be hesitant to go in
45. To be clear, I am not suggesting that there would be much profit in making technical argu-
ments about the traditional roles of equity courts and law courts; nor am 1 suggesting that traditional
courts of either stripe behaved in the stylized way implied by this dichotomy. My point is that, with
at least some degree of basis in fact, "law" and "equity" have come to represent different approaches
to judging—different judicial impulses i f  you will—and that the side of  judging associated with
"equity" has been under attack in recent years.
46. The "Legal Process" school of looking at questions about the power of judges and the roles
of different institutions is largely traceable to two works: HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT
WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (Foundation Press 1953) and the oft-
cited, though n e v e r
-
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PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (Cambridge, Mass., Tentative ed. 1958). For
a clear discussion of the basic principles at the heart of this approach, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953 (1994).
47. For a discussion of some of the reasons for the (partial) decline of the legal process model,
see Fallon, supra note 46, at 971-76.
48. See Id at 974 ("The best Legal Process scholarship continues to consider issues of how to
get the 'best' performances from various institutions of government, including courts.").
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order to avoid stepping on the toes o f  better-positioned legislators o r
administrators, yet also one that actively seeks to identify those cases and
questions that are best addressed through the unapologetic application of
judicial judgment to concrete legal disputes.
E. Litigation as Democracy
As I have written elsewhere, litigation is, at its core, a quintessen-
tially democratic act ivity.
49  " A n y o n e  
o f  
a n y  
s o c i a
l  
s t a t




a g  
t h e
i r
so-called betters into court and make them answer before a body whose
j b i t  is to neutrally adjudicate that d ispute."
5() T o  t h o s e  o f  
u s  w h o
believe i n  the  democratic promise o f  litigation, the  court-closing
decisions o f  the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts run contrary to our basic
civic principles. Th e re  is rhetorical and analytical power in thinking
about barriers to litigation as part and parcel o f  a broader assault on de-
mocratic norms. T h e  rig id  enforcement o f  court-closing rules, the
parsimonious interpretation o f  remedial statutes, and the expansion o f
doctrines like qualified and statutory immunity that categorically exclude
some transgressors f ro m monetary liab ility,  thwart the exercise o f
democratic citizenship i n  much the same wa y as butterfly ballots
and intentionally overbroad felon disenfranchisement campaigns.
51 I nthinking about the role o f  the judge, some attention might be given to
replacing the notion of a judge as gate-keeper with the image of judge as
facilitator o f  democratic participation. Th o u g h  the contours o f  this
argument are probably the least developed o f  any o f  the sets o f  tools
mentioned in  this Part, they provide yet another fertile area in  which




49. Siegel, supra note 1, at 1159-60 & n.256; Andrew M. Siegel, From Bad to Worse?: Some
Early Speculation About the Roberts Court and the Constitutional Fate of the Poor, 59 S.C. L. REV.
851,862 (2008).
50. Siegel, supra note 49, at 862.
51. For some more direct links between the Rehnquist Court's hostility to litigation and its
handling of the 2000 Florida election controversy, see Siegel, supra note 1, at 1176-96.
